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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 100, S.E.I.U.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330-1776-75

and
Adelphi University

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Benico Gonzales? If not what shall be the
remedy?
The hearing was held in the offices of the American
Arbitration Association, April 29, 1976 at which time Mr. Gonzale
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and University appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
The grievant was discharged on October 21, 1975 for refusing to perform certain duties which were a regular part of his
job classification and following an earlier warning and disciplin
ary suspension for similar or related offenses.
The grievant was employed as a fireman in the boiler room0
The fundamental job of a fireman is to observe and record readings
of meters, gauges and other dials on the ooilers and on certain
equipment related to the University's swimming pool.

In addition

-2-

he is assigned other collateral work to provide him with a full
work schedule„

Such other work involves sweeping and cleaning

the work area and other maintenance and mechanical work as set
forth in daily written instructions given to him or left for him
by his supervisor.
On October 13, 1975 the grievant was warned both orally
and in writing that he must "carry out work orders issued to you
by either your foreman or supervisor."

That warning resulted

from his "refusal to follow out work orders given....by (your)
foreman."

He was expressly warned that "any refusal.„..to carry

out a work order will result in.... termination."

Shortly there-

after, on October 17, 1975, the grievant was suspended until
October 20th for failure to complete a work assignment and was
again warned of the requirement "to follow all instructions of
your supervisors.... failure to do so will result in.... immediate
discharge without further warnings or suspension."
It is the University's contention that immediately upon
his return to work from the suspension he again deliberately
refused to perform his required job duties, and that his discharg
which followed and which is the subject of this arbitration, was
warranted.
Based on the record the University's action in discharging
the grievant was for just cause and is upheld.
The grievant is an intelligent man who is fully familiar
with the duties of a fireman in the boiler room.

His own testi-

mony shows that he has done considerable reading on the subject

-4of boiler maintenance and safety.

Though this is commendable,

he has used the knowledge obtained in an exaggerated, insubordinate and improper manner.
I am persuaded by the record that the grievant

willfully

decided to substitute his own judgement for that of management
as to what work a fireman should perform in the boiler room.

He

decided, contrary to management's instructions and warnings,
that a fireman's duties should be confined to observing, checking
testing and maintaining the meters, gauges, and other equipment
directly connected with the boiler, the boiler systems and the
swimming pool.

He resisted and refused to perform other

collateral duties such as cleanup, routine maintenance, and other
relatively unskilled duties as assigned.

When he was warned on

October 13 and suspended on October 17 it was because he resisted,
refused, or failed to complete, within adequate time allowances,
these collateral or additional assignments.

His position was

that safety and proper boiler room procedures required full
time attention to the meters, gauges, and mechanical equipment
connected to the boiler system and the swimming pool; and that
for the job to be done properly and to insure safety, no
was available to perform the collateral work assignments.

time
Or,

even if time was available, the collateral assignments took him
too far from the boilers and the swimming pool to protect against
a precipitate unsafe condition in the event that such condition
developed.

In this respect the grievant manifestly

substituted

-5-

his judgement as to what was required of a fireman in the boiler
room for that of management and supervision.

For, so far as

management and his supervisors were concerned, the boiler and
swimming pool systems are safe; their safety is ensured without
the all consuming attention which the grievant contends is required; and that in any event the grievant was instructed otherwise, and that contrary to those instructions he decided to do
it his way.

Neither the warning nor suspension were grieved,

and hence must be considered as factually correct and
disciplinarily proper.
On October 21, 1975 the grievant's action and attitude
was equally insubordinate and defiant, though it took a different
tack.

This time he gave all his attention to the collateral

or additional duties and, for the first time in the period of
his employment, did not check, read, and record meter, dial and
gauge readings and settings which the University, and the grievant
up to that point, both construed to be an essential and fundamental duty of the fireman.

I reject the grievant's assertion

that he carried out all his duties, when he did all those things
which were left for him in written instruction form.

There is

no doubt that he knew, as was the case in the past, that the
written instructions

involved collateral duties which were to

be performed in addition to the fundamental and basic job of
reading, checking and recording meters, gauges and dials relating
to the boiler and swimming pool systems.

He cannot now assert

-6that the written instructions constituted either his exclusive
assignment that day, or a substitute for his principal
responsibility.

Rather I conclude that this was the grievant's

new method of demonstrating and implementing resistance to and
defiance of managerial authority.

I am persuaded that having

been warned and suspended for not performing the collateral
assignments the grievant persisted in his rejection of supervisory instruction by shifting to a strategy of planned neglect
of his fundamental assignment, while technically complying with
the written collateral assignment.

This was defiance and in-

subordination in another form, but defiance and insubordination
nonetheless.

And it was particularly

aggregious because it

occurred virtually immediately after the grievant had been
warned and suspended for a similar attitude.

That proximity

supports the conclusion that the grievant planned to continue
his defiant attitude.
The grievant's continued intent to resist and reject the
instructions of supervision, is further evidenced by his extra
contractual resort to the campus newspaper.

Instead of

utilizing the grievance provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, he gave an interview to the campus newspaper, and
claimed that the boilers were being maintained in an unsafe
condition.

That action, I believe not only demonstrated that

he believed his judgement about boiler maintenance and safety
was superior to and should prevail over the procedures and

-7-

orders given him by management but also that he was not ignorant
of management's requirement that he perform both sets of duties.
He knew he was expected to perform both his primary functions
as well as the assigned collateral duties.

What he sought was

support for his position that only the primary duties should be
required.
In sum I conclude that the grievant knowingly engaged in
a planned campaign of defiance and insubordination to call
dramatic attention to his views.

It is immaterial if his

intentions were good and if he sincerely thought, albeit
erroneously I believe, that safety required the procedures
which he advocated, because he should have utilized instead
the prescribed and orderly grievance and arbitration procedures
of the contract.

His utilization of self-help was impermissable

Because he was warned and suspended previously, and yet refusec
to heed those actions his subsequence defiance of managerial
instructions when the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the contract were available to air his complaints, warranted
his discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegation's

of the above

named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge
of Benico Gonzales.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-8-

DATED: May 21, 1976
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York ) '
On this twenty-first day of May, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 518, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD

and

Case #12 30 0274 75

The Allen Manufacturing Company

In accordance with Article X of the collective bargaining
agreement dated October 9, 1973 - October 8, 1976 between Local
518, UAW, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and The Allen
Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide disputes involving the Union's grievances 169, 170, 171,
175, 178. 179, 130, 131, 183, 186.
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Blooir.f ield.
| Connecticut on February 12, 1976. at which time representatives
of the Union and Company hereinafter referred to jointly as the
parties, appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument, and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
All grievances involve an allegation by the Union that the
Company improperly transferred employees to work assignments out
of their classification and/or to other departments in violation
of Article V Section 21 (particularly the first sentence thereof)
and "letter no. 17" (on page 60) of the contract.
The first sentence of Article V Section 21 reads:
Each department shall hira, layoff and recall
from layoff independently of other departments.

i
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The portion of "letter no. 17" upon which the Union relies
reads:
Memo establishing intent and understanding of
temporary transfers
An employee may also be temporarily
under the following conditions:

transferred

b) To replace an employee who is absent for any
reason other than layoff until such time as that
employee returns to work.
The gravamen of the Union's complaints is that certain
employees were transferred to other classifications and/or other j
departments when other employees who previously worked in these ;
latter jobs and departments were on layoff.

It is the contention]
i
of the Union that those transfers or assignments cut of classification or into other departments violaced the recall rights of
certain employees on layoff.

The Union points to paragraph b of

letter no. 17 and argues that temporary transfers are permitted
only to replace an employee who is absent for a reason other
layoff.

And that inasmuch as the layoff ranks included employees;

laid off from the very classifications and departments into which!
the active employees were transferred, those transfers were
barred by the explicit limitation of paragraph b.
The Union's reliance on Article V Section 21, as I under-

I

j
stand it, is that j o b s of the same classification, but located
,
i
in different departments, are to be treated independently of eachJ

other for purposes of layoff and recall; and therefore a temporary
transfer of an employee in a particular classification to a job

-3assignment within the same classification but in a different
department is violative of the independent layoff and recall
rights of the employees who occupied both jobs.

If, argues the

Union, one such employee is assigned to do the work of both
jobs inter-departmentally, when the other has been laid off, it
is both violative of the independent status of each position as
enunciated in Article V Section 21, and in derogation of the
rights of the laid off employee to be retained or to be recalled
for the available work.
I do not consider the Union's reliance on Article V Section
21 to represent an assertion that any employee was wrongly laid
.off.

The instant grievances neither involve nor protest any

layoffs per se.

There is no evidence in the record chat when

this plant experienced a general diminution of work, it laid off
employees improperly or in violation of the layoff provisions of
j

the

contract.
Accordingly T am satisfied that with regard to Article V

I
Section 21 and paragraph b of letter no. 17, the Union's theory j
of the case is the same; namely that when employees in particular
classifications and/or departments are on layoff, the Company
may not temporarily transfer remaining active employees into
those different classifications or different departments.
Because letter no. 17 deals more specifically with the problem,
I deem an answer to the respective rights of the parties under
letter no. 17 an adequate answer to the issues involved.

-4The Company also relies on letter no. 17 but on paragraph
d thereof which reads:
When there is a lack of work in a department,
employees may be transferred to other departments that are on a forty hour schedule for a
period not to exceed four weeks.
The Company defends its actions on the following grounds:
1. The transfers were from one department to
another because of lack of work in the original
department or classification within the meaning
of paragraph d foregoing.
2. Employees were not transferred to replace
an employee who x-;as on layoff, but rather were
assigned work in a different classification,
job, or department to "fill out their work day"
instead of sending them home when the diminished
quantity cf work in their regular job assignment
ran out before che end cf the work day.
3. The work to which an active employee was transferred was actually work within his rssular job
assignment and jco description and hence did riot
constitute a transfer at all.
It is evident that the issues are ioinsd over the applica- i
tion and interpretation of letter no. 17, particularly paragraphs
b and d thereof.

More particularly, the question narrows to

whether the Company's action was barred by paragraph b or
permitted under paragraph d.
It is a well settled rule of contract law that provisions
of an agreement (including a letter memorandum) should be inter-i
preted in harmony rather than in conflict.

j
i
are independent of each other and are entitled to equal standing!
and enforcement.

Paragraphs b and d

Neither should be interpreted to pre-empt or

nullify or as an exception to the other unless the memorandum

j
1

-5explicitly so provides, which it does not in this case.

There-

fore the right to transfer an employee to another department
because of a lack of work in his own department should not be
restricted by the fact that there are employees laid off from
the department to which the transfer is made.

By the same toker

that type of transfer should not be allowed if its purpose is
to replace an employee who is on layoff.

A rule of reason mus

be invoked in order to reconcile and make harmonious paragraphs !

b and d.
As I see it the essential reconciliation is achieved, by
considering the quantity of work and the amount of time spent
by an employee in the department to which he has been transferred
when employees who previously worked in that department and job '
are on layoff. If the quantity of work assigned to the transfer^
'"
"
i
is of sufficient magnitude or duration to warrant recall of a
j
qualified employee from layoff, then the transfer, even if due i
to a lack of work in the "home" job or department would violate I
the prohibition on transfers to replaces an employee on layoff.
On the other hand if the amount of work and the period of time
involved in the transfer is minor and realistically insufficient!
to support the recall of an employee from layoff, then such a
transfer to "fill out an active employees work day" would be
due to the "lack of work" condition permitted under paragraph
d and would not constitute a replacement for an employee on
layoff.

-6With this interpretation a number of the instant grievance^
may be disposed of.

The transfer in grievance no. 171 of a

Brown and Sharp Operator in department 85 (1) to the job of
Thread and Knurl Operator in department 83, at a time that the
Knurl Operator was on layoff, was for five and one-half hours.
In grievance 169 the transfer of an electrician in department
62 to the job of repairman in the Maintenance and Repair
Department, while a repairman was on layoff, was for one hour
and a half.

In grievance 181 the transfer of a Set-Up man

from department 82 to Machine Operation elsewhere was for less
than one shift.

Grievances 178 and 179 involving a similar

type of transfer of a Set-Up man were approximately for the
same period of time.

Manifestly all such transfers were for

less than four weeks and hence in that regard were in compliance
with paragraph d.

More relevant however, within the rule of

reason formula which I deem applicable, the periods of time
involved-, and consequently the quantity of "out of classification" work was not enough to warrant the recall of qualified
employees from layoff.

To have required the Company to recall

an employee for a quantity of work and for periods of time
measured in hours, and less than one day is administratively
and operationally unsound, and I believe, not required by the
recall provisions of the contract, nor intended by the restrict-j
ions of paragraph b.

Therefore I deem the transfers in those

i

grievances to have been due to "lack of work in a department"

•'

within the meaning of paragraph d, and not as a replacement for !

-7an employee on layoff.

Accordingly those grievances are

denied.
However the amount of time and hence the quantity of
work involved in the transfers in grievances 186, 170, 175
and 183 were of such magnitude as to constitute

|
|

available

work in a job classification from which employees had been
laid off, warranting recalls.

\
I
In erievance 186 a department ;

!

88 Operator-Set Up-In Faed-Centerless Grinder was transferred;
to the job of Inspector in department 73 and worked for a

j
I
period of twelve days at a time when an Inspector was on lay-j
I
off. Grievances 170 and 175 are companion to each other and j
it

involve the same incident.

The Company expanded the assign- ;
I1
ment of a departmental clerk to encompass the same clerical
I
duties in an additional department following the layoff of
'
j
the clerk in that latter location. This assignment is contusing and undisputedly has exceeded four weeks.

In grievance i

183 a Set-Up Men in department 85(2) was transferred to the

;
i

second shift not only to perform Set-Up work but also to work
as a Machine Operator at a time when the second shift operator
j
was on layoff. This assignment is continuing, has exceed four
i
weeks and involves approximately eight hours work each day. ;
i
I find each of these transfers for lack of work in a depart|
ment.

With regard to grievances 170 and 175 the record is not
tI
i
precise as to how much clerical work is available in the
1
is
department which was added to the duties of the encumbent,
'

-8active clerk(s).

I recognize and understand the practical

reasons why the Company decided it needed two rather than
three departmental clerks to handle the available clerical
work in view of the diminution of business.

I

i

But as a continu-

ing situation I find a presumption in favor of a conclusion

I
i
that the additional or expanded assignment which is concededly i
inter-departmental, not only exceeded the four week limitation:
set forth in paragraph b, but was and is of a quantity which
runs afoul of the prohibition in paragraph b on replacements
of layoffs.

In short, though the practical considerations may

support the Company's action, the explicit limitations and
prohibitions in letter no. 17 bar the Company's action absent:

I
the Uni.on's consent or cooperation. The twelve days involved !
i
in grievance 1.86 though not in excess of four weeks, is ncne- ;
|
theless enough to warrant the recall c± an Inspector from
;
I
layoff and consequently I construe that transfer more as a

j
i

replacement for an employee on layoff than a transfer for lack !
i
of work within a department. That the transfer in grievance
i
!

183 was "voluntarily agreed to", is immaterial.

The fact is

!

that the Company transferred the Set-Up man from the first to
the second shift so that he could perform not only set-up
duties but also take over Machine Operations previously performed by a second shift machine operator who had been laid
off.

The transferred

employee is working a full second shift, j
i
and the Company has not demonstrated that the machine operator I
work he performs is a minor or negligible part of his second

-9shift operation.

Again, though the Company argues that the

arrangement was made to "fill up" the transferee's work day,
it cannot be denied that a significant purpose was also to
replace a machine operator who was laid off.

On balance I

construe the transfer and its affect more as a replacement
for an employee laid off than because of lack of work in the
department.
Accordingly Union grievances 170, 175, 183 and 186 are
granted.
Grievance no. 180 is the only grievance in which the
basic facts are in dispute.

The Union contends that a depart-

ment 89 Heat Treater was assigned work in the classificaLi.cn
of a Grade 1 Tool. Hardener in department 77(1) at a time that
a Grade 1 Tool Hardener was on layoff.

The Company asserts

that the work involved was properly within the Heat Treo.ucr
classification and therefore did noc constitute s. transfer.
The evidence as to which classification covers the disputed
work is conflicting and off-setting.

The job description

seems to suggest that the Heat-Treater classification includes!
Tool Hardening.

On the other hand the practice over the years

has been for the Heat Treater to perform the work in dispute
only when the Tool Hardener was ill, on vacation or otherwise
absent; and under those circumstances, prior to an up-grade,
the Heat Treater received a pay differential.

Additionally

there is some evidence that performance of Tool Hardening
work by the Heat Treater was based on a mutual agreement

-10between the Company and the Union, which may have beerconsistent with or a variation from the job classifications
involved.

|
Also there is some evidence that the second shift j
I

Heat Treater performs the same work as the first shift Tool
Hardener.

Determinative under the circumstances, where the

1
I

evidence on which classification covers the disputed work is
I

inconclusive, is the quantity of Tool Hardening work available!.
The undisputed testimony is that it dees not exceed twelve

!

hours a week.

That quantity is not sufficient to warrant the j
!
recall of the Tool Hardener from layoff, for if recalled he
:
would have only about two and one-half hours of work a day.
Inasmuch as the Union has not shown that the disputed work

;
j
i

belongs in a classification different from the Heat Treater,

\

I cannot conclude that this grievance involves a transfer,

:
i

and therefore the tour week limitation referred to in para-

[

graph d does not apply.

Accordingly grievance 130 is denied. ;
i
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
j

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
1.

Grievances 169, 171, 178, 179, 180,
181 are denied.

2.

Grievances

170, 175, 183, 186 are granted.

The Company shall cease and desist from making
or continuing the transfers in these grievances.
The Company shall pay the senior qualified employees
on layoff for the periods of times transferees performed jobs for which the laid off employees should
have been recalled. If the work proscribed to the

-11transferees is to be performed, the Company
shall effectuate recalls from layoff, unless
other mutually satisfactory arrangements with
the Union are made.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: April 7, 1976
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this seventh day of April, 1976,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
executed the same.

before me personallyj
known and known to j
who executed the
j
to me that he

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Allied Maintenance (Co-op City)
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A76-727

and
Local 32E SEIU

The stipulated issue is:
Did Alexander Vargas commit the offense
alleged by the Company on November 3,
1975?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on August 19, 1976 at which time Mr. Vargas
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" appeared.

Counsel

and representatives of the above named Company also appeared.
With the consent of the above named Union, the grievant was
represented at the hearing and throughout this proceeding by
counsel from the Bronx Legal Services Corporation.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

With the agreement

of the parties and in their presence the Arbitrator made a
visitation on August 31, 1976 to the location at Co-op City, to
observe part of what was testified to.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was expressly waived, and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was employed by the Company to perform
janitorial and maintenance services at Co-op City in the Bronx.
The Company charges him with the theft of a quantity of plastic
trash bags belonging to Co-op City.

That charge is the explicit

-2subject of the stipulated issue.

Implicit as part of the issue

in this arbitration is the propriety of the Company's action in
discharging the grievant for that alleged offense.

It is acknow-

ledged that if the Arbitrator finds the grievant did not commit
the offense charged, he is to be reinstated and made whole for
his losses.

If the Arbitrator finds that the grievant committed

the theft, the parties have authorized the Arbitrator either to
fashion a penalty (which the Company contends should be to uphold
the discharge) or to hold a subsequent hearing on the question of
what penalty should be imposed.
As a discharge case, where the offense charged parallels
a crime, this Arbitrator, while not holding the Company to the
standard of proof in criminal cases, nonetheless requires that
the grievant's culpability be established by clear and convincing
evidence.

The burden to do so is on the Company.

Based on the entire record before me the probative evidence
falls short of meeting that burden and standard.
The Company's case is based primarily on the testimony of
Co-op City security guard Cornetheus Williams.

At the hearing

Mr. Williams testified that while he was positioned on a walk
way near building 28 across the street from a back alley he saw
a man, later identified as the grievant, walking along the back
alley off which various stores including Snack City are located.
(The rear door of Snack City was located off that alley.) On
direct examination and again on cross-examination he stated

-3expressly and unequivocally that he saw the grievant carrying a
large package; that he saw him walk to the back door of Snack
City and leave the package there; watched him leave the rear
door of Snack City and proceed back to the alley and around
another building of the development toward the front door of
Snack City.

He stated that at that point he followed the

grievant into Snack City through its front door.

Thereafter, he

testified he found a package of plastic bags in the kitchen of
Snack City, opened the package, saw it was marked "Co-op City",
and recognized the plastic bags as those used by the maintenance
force at the development.

He further testified that an employee

of Snack City named "Mike" told him that the grievant asked that
the bags be kept there until he, the grievant, could return
with his car to pick them up.

Williams stated that he then left

Snack City to report the incident to his superiors, and when he
returned the package of plastic bags was gone.
On the visitation to the site, Williams changed his
testimony in two critical areas.

He stated that he was not

positioned on a walkway near building 28 when he first saw the
grievant but rather was located in the middle of a Co-op City
roadway and was walking across the street away from the alley
when he first saw the grievant rounding the corner of the alley,
some distance away, walking in his direction.

He said that he

continued walking across the street in a direction away from
the grievant towards building 28, and then for the first time

-4positioned himself at the building 28 location to observe what
the grievant did.

At the hearing he was firm and unequivocal

in stating that he saw the grievant walk to the rear door of
Snack City and explicit in his testimony that he saw the
grievant deposit a package at that location.

But at the site

it was obvious to the Arbitrator as well as to counsel for both
sides that from the position at which Williams stated he was
located, it is physically impossible to see the back door
location of Snack City.

Williams could have only seen the

grievant walking down the alley and up a ramp towards the back
door location.

Part way up the ramp the grievant was out of the

line of sight.

Thereafter the grievant could not have again

been seen until he descended down a ramp back into the alley.
So, despite William's insistence both on direct and cross-examination that he saw the grievant all the way to the rear door
of Snack City and saw him deposit a package at that location,
that testimony cannot be accurate.

With the burden of proof on

the Company I am not prepared to gloss over Williams' changed
testimony regarding where he was located when he first saw the
grievant, or the discovery upon the visitation of the impossibility of observing the grievant at the Snack City rear door,
as

inadvertence, or investigatory inexperience or mere

conclusionary

license.

Williams is an experienced security

guard who had full opportunity at the hearing to accurately
explain his location at the time of the alleged incident.

-5Because he was asked explicitly and sharply on direct and crossexamination he had full opportunity to accurately recite what wa
in his line of vision and what was not.

I find no satisfactory

explanation for these changes and inaccuracies in his testimony.
The fact is that he did not see what he originally stated he had
seen, and that inaccuracy is on a highly important, if not
critical point.
Moreover, if he first saw the grievant from what he later
testified was his position in the middle of the road, and he was
suspicious about the package which he claims the grievant was
carrying, I fail to see why he would have continued in a direction away from the grievant to a location from which he could
not see him at all times.

It seems to me that the logical,

almost automatic reaction of a security guard would have been to
proceed towards the grievant, watch him from a shorter distance
to clearly ascertain what he was carrying and what he did with
the package or question him about it, and apprehend him with the
package in his possession, or at least retrieve it from the rear
door location.
Williams' testimony upon which the Company's case rests, i;
not corroborated by any other witness.

Though that type of

corroboration is not essential in a disciplinary proceeding, the
_
aforementioned noted frailties and inconsistencies raise serious
doubts regarding the probative conclusiveness of his testimony.
Further, he stated that after he went in to Snack City he observed

-6the rear door and saw Snack City employee "Mike" open the back
door and bring in a package which Williams contends he later
identified as the Co-op City plastic bags.

Corroboration of

that part of Williams' testimony could have been achieved by the
testimony of Mike.

For not only did Williams state that Mike

brought the bags in to Snack City from the rear door, but that
Mike told him the grievant asked that the bags be kept there
until he could get his car and pick them up.

Yet Mike was not

called as a witness and there is no explanation in the record why
he was not called.

Hence in the face of equivocal and inaccurate

testimony by Williams regarding one critical phase of the incident which could not be corroborated because there were no
other witnesses, another phase of his testimony which could have
been corroborated by a person allegedly involved was not, and
the record is devoid of why that was not done.
In short, Williams' testimony turns out to be changed and
questionable, and hence unreliable on essential points (i.e.
what he actually saw and from where ), and therefore those
essential elements of the allegation of theft have not been
adequately established to my satisfaction.

For the Company's

case to rest on that testimony, is for it to suffer from the
same weaknesses.
Of course there are facts which are adverse to the grievant
He denies the charge, testifying that he went to Snack City by
way of the back door,

carrying nothing.

Yet his explanation

-7that he traveled that route from his place of work because it
was the "shorter" way to get to Snack City is unpersuasive
because the distance is longer.

Also there is no evidence in

the record that Williams would misrepresent what he saw or that
he would bear false witness against the grievant •

Thes(

factors raise suspicions and even speculative inferences regarding the grievant's guilt.

However in this type of case,

suspicions, inferences and questionable explanations are not
enough to conclude that the grievant is culpable of the offense
charged, where the Company's case falls short of establishing
that culpability clearly and convincingly.

I am not prepared to

hold that the grievant did not commit the offense charged.
issue is not whether he has established his innocence.

The

Rather

it is whether the Company, by the traditional standards required
in such cases, namely by clear and convincing evidence, has
established his culpability to the satisfaction of this
Arbitrator.

The Company's case does not do so, and lingering

suspicions, inferences or surmise are not enough to cure the
inadequacy.

Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

-8The Company has not met its burden of
establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that Alexander Vargas committed
the offense alleged by the Company on
November 3, 1975. Mr. Vargas shall be
reinstated and made whole for wages lost
less any earnings he received from gainful employment during the period of his
discharge.

Schmertz
/'
Arbitrator
DATED: September 29, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " '
On this twenty-ninth day of September, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local No. Ill International Chemical
Workers' Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #75K-00551

and
American Cyanamid Company
Bound Brook Plant

The stipulated issue is:
Were the two day disciplinary suspensions
imposed on W. Rnox, F. Lyons and G. Ziminsky
proper? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 5, 1976 at the offices of the
Company at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was expressly waived.
On May 9, 1975, Messrs. Knox, Lyons and Ziminsky, herewith
referred to as the "grievants" refused to perform a work assignment involving the replacement of dust collector bags in Building
94.

They contended, as they had done the day before when the

assignment was first made, that the job was unsafe.
Upon their refusal on May 9th, they were sent home for the
balance of that day, and in addition were penalized with the two
day suspensions which are the subject of the stipulated issue.
The Company contends that the grievants' refusal to perform
the work assignment constituted a "failure to carry out instructions or orders...." within the meaning of Rule No. 18 of the
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Company's Working Rules, for which a penalty of a "warning notice
or 1-5 days off" is set forth for the first offense.
The Union asserts that with regard to the instant dispute,
Rule No. 18 of the Company's unilaterally promulgated Working
Rules is preempted by the bilaterally negotiated provisions of
Section 6.5 of the collective bargaining agreement.

The pertinent

part of that Section reads:
If an employee feels a job assignment
cannot be done safely, the Shop Steward
shall be called immediately by the Supervisor. If after discussion with the Shop
Steward and Supervisor, the employee still
feels he cannot do the job safely, the
Supervisor will make an effort to give him
another job assignment or may send him home
for the balance of the shift, to return to his
regular work the next scheduled day. Should
it be determined that an employee was sent home
unjustly, he shall not suffer loss of pay for
the hours not worked.
The Union argues that the extent of the penalty that may
be imposed on an employee "who feels he cannot do the job safely"
is to be sent "home for the balance of the shift", thereby depriving him of pay only for that period of time.
The parties have stipulated that the question of whether
or not the job assignment was safe is not before this Arbitrator.
Rather the question is, assuming arguendo without so agreeing or
conceding,that the job was safe, and therefore that the grievants
were wrong in their "feeling" that it was unsafe, were they
subject to a two day disciplinary suspension in addition to
being sent home for the balance of their shift? In short, the
contractual propriety of the two day disciplinary suspensions

-3 is all this Arbitrator is asked to decide.
It is well settled that an employer has the right to
unilaterally promulgate working rules, and that those rules are
enforceable even if not agreed to by or negotiated with the
Union, if adequately disseminated, uniformly and consistently
applied and if they are reasonable.

Obviously, implicit in the

matter of reasonableness is that they not be in conflict with any
bilaterally negotiated part of the collective agreement.
I find that Rule No, 18, insofar as it may be applied
to a refusal of an employee to perform a work assignment which he
"feels" is unsafe, is in conflict with Section 6.5 of the contract
Section 6.5 is clear.

It specifies what shall be done if

an employee considers a job unsafe and, for that reason, declines
to perform it.

It limits the Company's action to "making an

effort to give him another job assignment" or to "send(ing) him
home for the balance of the shift."

Having expressly dealt with

the problem of conflicts over alleged unsafe job assignments the
question of discipline beyond the loss of the balance of the
shift was well within the contemplation of the parties, and
should have been included as part of Section 6.5 had the parties
intended that such further discipline was appropriate and proper.
By not doing so, but rather by jointly agreeing to the present
language of Section 6.5, the Company waived any right it may have
had to invoke Rule No. 18 and to impose a greater penalty than
Section 6.5 provides, in the situations covered by that Section.
Indeed, Section 6.5 also provides that after being sent home for

-4the balance of the shift the employee "shall return to his
regular work the next scheduled day" (emphasis added).

I fail

to see how the parties would have agreed to that sequence if an
intervening disciplinary suspension was also possible or contemplated.

For, as here, a disciplinary suspension following

being sent home would make impossible the return to regular work
"the next scheduled day", and that explicit part of Section 6.5
could not be complied with.
In sum, in the absence of a past practice otherwise,

I

accept the Union's argument that the explicit limitations set
forth in Section 6.5, as a bilaterally negotiated part of the
contract, takes precedent over the Company's unilaterally
promulgated Rule 18 under the facts in the instant case.
There has been no past practice one way or the other.
The Company acknowledges that there have been no prior instances
in which employees have been disciplined beyond being

sent home

for the balance of the shift, for failure or refusal to perform
a work assignment they felt was unsafe.

But that acknowledgement

is based on its undisputed assertion that no employee, following
an initial refusal persisted in refusing to perform the work
assignment when reassigned to it the next day.

(Which distinguishes

those situations from the instant case, the Company argues, because here the grievants debated the safety of the job on May 8th
and did not perform it, and again refused to perform it on May 9th).
So the present implementation of Rule 18 under the factual
situation covered by Section 6.5 of the contract is one of first

-5-

impression.

In that circumstance the clear and explicit language

of Section 6.5 must prevail, and the Company's right to send the
employees home must be construed not only as a penalty, but as
a penalty bilaterally agreed to, to the exclusion of something
more severe or extensive.
However, the Union is cautioned that this decision may not
be used as a license for wide-spread or irresponsible refusals
by employees to perform work assignments because they "feel"
the job is unsafe.

If Section 6.5 is so utilized, by an

employee, groups of employees, or the Union as their representative, this Arbitrator would consider that an abuse of what was
agreed to under Section 6.5 and an improper and impermissible
application of that Section, warranting further disciplinary
penalties.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The two disciplinary suspensions imposed
on W. Knox, F. Lyons and G. Ziminsky were
not proper. The suspensions are reversed
and those employees shall be made whole
for the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 12, 1976
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twelfth day of May, 1976 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Writer's Guild of America, East, Inc.
and

OPINION AND AWARD
on
ARBITRABILITY
Case No. 1330 0487 76

American Broadcasting Company

In accordance with Article XX of the collective bargaining agreement dated February 14, 1973 between Writer's Guild of
America, East, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and
American Broadcasting Company, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company", the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issues:

1. Is the grievance of Willie Suggs
arbitrable?
2. If so, is Willie Suggs entitled
under Article IV Paragraph C of
the contract to $56 a week for the
period September 12, 1974 to
September 12, 1975 for certain
work she performed in connection
with "Americans All"?
3. If so, under Article IX of the
contract is Willie Suggs entitled
to credit as "Produced and Written
By" or "Written and Produced By"
for the period of September 12, 1974
to September 12, 1975 for certain
work she performed in connection
with "Americans All"?

Hearings were held at the offices of the American

-2Arbitration Association on July 21 and December 14, 1976 at
which time Ms. Suggs, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The two

aforementioned hearings were confined to the issue of arbitrability.

At the conclusion of the second hearing the arbitrator

ruled that he would first determine that issue.

Article XX Paragraph B of the contract provides in pertinent part that a grievance which cannot be settled by the
parties through the grievance machinery may be submitted to
arbitration to the American Arbitration Association,
provided that if such grievance has not
been submitted to arbitration within
six (6) months after such grievance arose,
such grievance shall be deemed to have
been abandoned.

The grievance was filed with the American Arbitration
Association on March 5, 1976.

Based on the record before me I

conclude that the "grievance arose" within the meaning of
Article XX Paragraph B sometime in September, 1974.

Issue no.

2 of the stipulated issues so indicates, by making a claim for
both pay and credit for a period of time commencing September
12, 1974.

More importantly, the grievant, acknowledged that

in September of 1974 she felt she was performing work of a
higher classification and that she was entitled to additional
pay and additional credit for those services.

There is no

-3question that she knew of the problem as early as September
1974, because at or about that time she initiated discussions
with representatives of the Company in an effort to obtain
"credit" for work which she considered to be of a Producer or
Associate Producer classification.

Hence from any determina-

tive standpoint, i.e. the meaning of when a grievance "arose"
under Article XX Paragraph B; the interpretation of that wording in the arbitration award of Arbitrator Benjamin C. Roberts
of October 22, 1976; and when the grievant knew of a condition
giving rise to a grievance, the instant grievance "arose" in
September 1974.
The grievance was not filed for arbitration within the
prescribed six months, but rather was submitted to the American
Arbitration Association almost a year and a half after it arose
Counsel for the Union argues that the arbitrator should disregard the contract time limit for submission of grievances
for arbitration on equitable grounds, and because the Company
would not be prejudiced if the case were heard and determined
on the merits.
the contrary.

The well settled and traditional view is to
The arbitrator is bound to the terms of the

contract as negotiated and written by the parties including
explicit time limits for the filing of grievances to the
arbitration forum.
unambiguous.

Here the time limit is both explicit and

If the grievance is not submitted to arbitration

within six months after it arose, it is deemed to have been
abandoned.

That is a classical "statute of limitation" which

-4the arbitrator may not ignore, and is binding on the parties
which negotiated it unless there has been an express or implied waiver.

For the arbitrator to disregard what the parties

mutually negotiated in such explicit terms would be to modify
or vary the terms of the contract.

I do not totally reject

the possibility that there may be occasions when because of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances a time limit of
this type should not be strictly enforced.

However the

instant case does not present any such extraordinary or
i
compelling circumstances; nor is there any evidence in the
record of any waiver of the time limit by the Company, either
expressly, by implication, by conduct or practice.
That the grievant believed that her individual discussions
with Company representatives after September of 1974 would
produce a satisfactory resolution of her complaint, and her
assertion that from September 1974 to September 1975 (the
latter date was when the Union first represented her in
discussions with the Company) she was unaware of her rights
under the collective bargaining agreement, are not explanations which toll the running of any specific time limit of
the submission of a grievance to arbitration.

During the

relevant period she was a member of the Union, but chose not
to appeal to the Union for advice or assistance, which if she
had done would have disclosed her grievance rights and the
time limits thereon.

Though she might have thought that her

-5individual discussions with Company representatives would resolve her complaint, there is no evidence whatsoever that the
Company agreed to waive any of the contract time limits either
for the filing of a grievance or for its submission to
arbitration.

It is well settled that meetings to discuss a

grievance, a willingness to attempt resolution, or any other
settlement discussions do not in and of themselves constitute
waivers of time limits.

A waiver must be explicit or implied

from conduct or practice.

Here it was not explicit and I find

nothing about the Company's actions in dealing with the
grievant individually or with her grievance which could be
construed as an implied waiver of the six month time requirement .
Nor is this a continuing grievance.

That the alleged

problem persisted over a one year period does not make it
"a continuing grievance," any more than an employee who is
discharged has a "continuing grievance" to seek his reinstatement by arbitration any time beyond six months after his
dismissal.

In the instant case the alleged problem arose once,

on or about September 12, 1974 and persisted unchanged thereafter.

It did not reoccur again and again nor was it reimposec

on the grievant by the Company at regular intervals during
the year.

Hence the characteristics and conditions of a

continuing grievance are not present in this case.

Therefore

the six month time period prescribed in Article XX Paragraph B
commenced to run on or about September 12, 1974, and there are

-6no circumstances in the record before me which suspended the
running of that period.
I find that neither the grievant, nor the Union on her
behalf, filed her grievance within the contractual time limit
required under Article XX Paragraph B, and therefore the
grievance is not arbitrable.
Based on the foregoing it is unnecessary for me to
decide whether the grievance was settled substantively at the
meeting between the parties on September 12, 1975.

And because

the grievance is time barred from arbitration, the Arbitrator
is without jurisdiction to hear or determine stipulated Issues
no. 2 and no. 3.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The grievance of Willie Suggs is not
arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 16, 1976
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixteenth day of December, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 8-917

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #76K06611

and
Ashland Chemical Company

In accordance with Article VIII of the collective bargaining
agreement dated October 8, 1974 between the above named Union and
Company the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Whether the Company violated the Plant
Rules and/or the disciplinary procedures
in those Plant Rules when it terminated
the employment of Albert Bartz? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Edison, New Jersey on March 11, 1976
at which time Mr. Bartz, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was expressly waived.

The

The Company filed a post-

hearing brief.
The pertinent sections of the Plant Rules read • :
Regular attendance, careful attention to
work and decent personal conduct is expected
of every employee as an essential element to
the operation of the plant. Offenses in these
respects will result in disciplinary action
proportionate to the seriousness and frequency
of the offense. The following listing indicates
the disciplinary action that will be taken for
the first offense in the group in which the
offense occurs. Subsequent offenses of the

-2 same nature will result in more severe
disciplinary action. Written warnings
or notices covering offenses of plant
rules will be removed from the employee's
personnel file one (1) year from date of
offense.
Group 1.
The first offense will result in a verbal
warning given by supervisor in presence of
a member of Union Committee. Note of incident will be sent to personnel file. Repeated offenses will result in written warning, layoff or discharge successively.
1. Failure to notify the Company of absence
within three hours after the time scheduled
for work and produce reasons satisfactory to
the Company as to why permission was not obtained in advance of the time scheduled for
work.
(A message to the switchboard, guard, paymaster or immediate supervisor is considered
adequate notice.)
2. Unauthorized absence or lateness for work
in excess of twoworking days per month. However, absence due to illness which is substantiated by a certificate from a medical
doctor is not to be considered as unauthorized
absence. Lateness reported, which is excused
by the Company, shall not be considered a
violation.
It is undisputed that within the aforementioned one year
period the grievant committed various offenses for which he was
verbally warned, warned in writing and suspended pursuant to the
"progressive discipline" procedure set forth in the foregoing
Rules.

The Union does not challenge the validity or propriety

of those prior disciplinary penalties nor does it dispute the
grievant's prior disciplinary record.
Accordingly, the more precise question in the instant
proceeding is whether the grievant committed additional offenses
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proscribed by the Plant Rules which in accordance with the
mandate of those Rules, warrant his dismissal.
The Company charges that the grievant was absent without
authority in excess of two working days during the month of
September, 1974, within the meaning of Group 1, Paragraph 2
of the Plant Rules, and that those unauthorized absences were
unexcused.

It asserts that as "repeated offenses" within the

same one year period subsequent to warnings and a disciplinary
suspension, the grievant's discharge automatically follows under
the penalty sequence explicitly provided in the Plant Rules.
Specifically the Company contends that the grievant was
absent without authority on September 2, 26, 29 and 30 and that
his explanations for each and all of these absences did not
constitute acceptable excuses.
The grievant, and the Union on his behalf contend that he
was sick on September 2 and 26; that he was unable to come to
work on September 29 and 30 because, returning from a religious
retreat, his car broke down around New Haven, Connecticut and
that a full day elapsed before it could be repaired.

And that

thereafter following the drive to New Jersey, it was too late
for him to report to work.

The Union argues that in each

instance the grievant notified the Company that he would be
absent or instructed someone else to so notify the Company; that
such notice was in compliance with Group 1 Paragraph 1 of the
Rules and should have been accepted by the Company as an excuse
for the grievant's absence.

Alternatively, and particularly

-4with reference to September 29 and 30, the Union contends that
the grievant adequately substantiated the breakdown of his car,
and that explanation should have

been accepted by the Company

as an excuse for those absences.
I must reject the Union's argument that bare notice to the
Company of an absence in accordance with the provisions of
Group 1 Paragraph 1 constitutes an excused absence.

If that

were the case Paragraph 2 would be unnecessary and rendered
meaningless.

Obviously an employee who is absent has two duties

under the Rules.

First to notify the Company of his absence

and second, to provide the Company with an acceptable excuse
for the absence.

That the grievant may have complied with

Paragraph 1 does not mean he met his obligations under Paragraph 2.
Considering the grievant's prior disciplinary record within the relevant one year period, and particularly the fact that
all disciplinary steps prior to discharge had been imposed on
him for previous violations of the Plant Rules, it was not unreasonable for the Company to require that he specifically
substantiate the reasons for his absences on September 2, 26,
29 and 30.

Indeed Paragraph 2 expressly provides for such

substantiation.

It permits the Company to require a medical

certificate in case of an absence with illness.

Impliedly,

in my judgement it authorizes the Company to require satisfactory
substantiation of other reasons for absences as well, especiall
here, in view of the grievant's disciplinary status at the time

-5The grievant did not provide adequate substantiation.

He

did not substantiate his alleged illnesses of September 2 and
26 with a medical certificate, though he was afforded the
opportunity to do so.

Regarding the breakdown of his car

he was asked to produce receipts for towing or repairs or other
documentation which would confirm the difficulty with his car
and the extended time allegedly required to make repairs.

All

that he produced was a statement from a friend to the effect
that the grievant had car trouble and stayed over at the
friend's house in New Haven until the car was repaired.

Con-

sidering the many questionable aspects of the grievant's story
of the car breakdown and the documents the Company requested,
this statement was not adequate.

The grievant did not explain

why it took almost twenty-four hours until a mechanic began
the repairs on his car.

The grievant did not explain satis-

factorily what was really wrong with the car, except that it
was a "minor transmission problem."

Without further substan-

tiation it is difficult to believe that the mechanic performed
the work without charge and that all the grievant paid was a
small amount for a part and a tip.

The grievant did not

adequately explain why after spending more than a full day at
his friend's house it took him an hour after repairs were made
to begin the trip back to New Jersey and why he could not have
made a better effort to report for work on September 30th.
Without more substantiation,

and considering the grievant's

past record, it is not surprising that the Company was

-6suspicious of the fact that his car broke down near the home
of a friend with whom the grievant also did business in a
private capacity.

The grievsnt was offered an opportunity to

provide additional information and documentation in support of
his story, including the opportunity to have other passengers
who were with him in the car come forward and support his
story or to testify for him in this arbitration proceeding.
He did not take that opportunity.

For all these reasons I do

not consider it unfair or unreasonable for the Company to have
concluded that the grievant's absences on September 29 and 30
remained inadequately explained and therefore unexcused.
Coupled with his unsubstantiated illnesses of September 2 and
26, the grievant was absent on an unexcused basis more than
two days within a month as proscribed by Paragraph 2, Group 1
of the Plant Rules.
Accordingly I do not find that the Company violated the
Rules or the disciplinary procedures in those Rules when it
imposed on the grievant the last step penalty (discharge) as
prescribed therein.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the Plant
Rules and/or the disciplinary procedures
in those Rules when it terminated the
employment of Albert Bartz.

ErZc J„Schmert
Arbitrator

-7DATED: April 29, 1976
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty ninth day of April, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bridgeport Education Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0265 75

and
Bridgeport Board of Education

The threshhold issue is whether the grievance is
arbitrable.
Hearings were held on February 5 and April 22, 1976 in
Bridgeport, Connecticut at which time representatives of the
Bridgeport Education Association, hereinafter referred to as the
"Association" and the Bridgeport Board of Education, hereinafter
referred to as the "Board" appeared. Both sides were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was expressly

waived.
The grievance presented by the Association in the instan
case is that the Board violated the contract by discontinuing a
$10.00 monthly expense allowance, previously granted to psychological examiners, for travel inside the school district.
The problem with the Union's effort to arbitrate that
complaint, is that the written grievance dated July 2, 1975, and
the dispute which was processed through the grievance procedure,
is substantively different then the Association's claim herein.
The written grievance claims a contract violation by the Board's
action in discontinuing expenses and compensation for psychological

-2examiners traveling outside the school system.
simply a technical or semantic distinction.

This is not

The fact is that

the Union's grievance of July 2, 1975 was granted by the Board.
In response to that grievance the Board guaranteed, as it did
again in the course of the instant hearings, that it would
continue to pay travel expenses and allowances to psychological
examiners when and if they traveled outside the system to perform
work assignments.

It is also not simply a technical or semantic

distinction, because the Board did not discontinue the payment
of travel expenses to psychological examiners traveling inside
the system until two months later, early in September, 1975.
Therefore the Union's grievance of July 2, 1975 cannot
be construed to cover a subsequent event, unless by the later
action of the parties it was understood that the earlier filed
grievance encompassed the subsequent action as well.
the record I do not find this to be so.

Based on

A grievance does not

arise, or become a justiciable issue, until a contract provision
has been breached.

The Board took no action which could be

deemed a contract breach with regard to the discontinuance of
travel allowances inside the system, until September, 1975.
While It is true that in the course of the processing of the
grievance complaining about the elimination of travel expenses
for travel outside the system, a representative of the Board did
express the view that the contract did not require the Board to
pay for travel inside the system.

But those were speculative

views, at most collateral to the grievance then being discussed,

-3and cannot be transformed
until implemented

into a contract breach unless and

into action.

What the Union complained about

at that time was the Board's action in terminating payment of
travel expenses for travel outside the system.

That complaint

was then a justiciable issue and ripe for the grievance procedure.
But speculative talk about whether or not the Board was obliged
to continue paying travel expenses for travel inside the system,
would not and did not ripen into a grievance until the Board
acted to terminate that particular benefit, and the Board did
not do so until two months later.

Nor is there anything in the

record which would indicate that the Association was foreclosed
from filing an appropriate grievance in September when the Board
terminated the payment of travel allowance for travel inside the
system.

Clearly the Association could have grieved at that time

but did not do so.

Nor is there evidence to support a contention

that the Association was either assured by the Board, or led to
believe by the Board that the earlier filed grievance over a
different benefit could be utilized or be deemed expanded to
include the dispute which arose on and after early September.
In other words, the Association's present contention that the
July 2, 1975 grievance operates to include the termination of
the payment of travel expenses to psychological examiners traveling inside the system, is self-serving and not supported by any
evidence of agreement or acquiescence by the Board.
In short, I find no reason, contractual or otherwise,
why the Association

should believe that its July 2, 1975 grievance,

-4which was granted by the Board in the Association's favor,
could thereafter be utilized to cover an action by the Board
which first occurred in September.

The Association should have

grieved in September when what had been simply a speculative
possibility became, for the first time, an alleged breach of
the contract.

Representatives of the Association have readily

conceded that they could have done so, and it is my ruling that
they should have done so in order to preserve the arbitrability
of that allegation.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's claim of a breach of
contract by the Board's discontinuance
on September 8, 1975 of the payment of
travel expenses to psychological examiners when traveling inside the system
is not covered by its grievance dated
July 2, 1975 and hence is not arbitrable
in this proceeding.

Erie//. Schmertz'
Arbitrator
DATED: June 7, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of June, 1976 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bridgeport Education Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1239-0184-76

and
Bridgeport Board of Education
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Board of Education violate Article
VI Section N of the collective bargaining
agreement by failing to pay psychological
examiners/school psychologists the expenses
set forth therein for the months March through
June, 1976? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Stratford, Connecticut at which time
representatives of the Board and the Association appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

Article VI Section N of the contract reads:
Supervisory personnel
Supervisory personnel shall be compensated
for car expense at the rate of $10 per month
for 10 month school year in lieu of gasoline
for travel within the school system and throughout the State for professional meetings.
After granting psychological examiners/school psychologists
the car expense allowance referred to above since at least 1968,
the Board unilaterally terminated the allowance sometime after
September, 1975.
The Board's position is that psychological examiners/school
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psychologists are not "supervisory personnel"; that they do not
meet the traditional legal requirements of supervisory status;
that the practice of paying the car allowance for a period of
years was an error; and as a practice inconsistent with the
language of the contract it may be unilaterally terminated by
the Board upon appropriate notice.
The Association's position is that psychological examiners/
school psychologists are "supervisory personnel" within the
meaning of the contract and that the long standing practice of
paying the expense allowance is conclusive evidence of the mutual
recognition and understanding of the parties that employees so
classified fell within supervisory categories.

The Association

argues that the Board may not now make a unilateral change in
what has been a bilaterally negotiated and bilaterally implement'
ed condition of employment.
In my judgement there are two theories applicable to this
case, both of which are supportive of the Association's grievance.
One is to treat the phrase "supervisory personnel" as insufficiently
clear or ambiguous as to its application to psychological examiners/school psychologists.

And the other is to adopt the Board's

argument that employees so classified are not supervisory as a
matter of law or within the meaning of this contract.
My own view is that the phrase "supervisory personnel" in
Article VI Section N of the contract is ambiguous as it relates
to psychological examiners/school psychologists.

What is of

consequence is not whether employees in those classifications

_ o_

meet the legal test of supervisory status but whether they are
deemed supervisory within the meaning and confines of this
particular collective bargaining agreement.

The contract does

not define "supervisory personnel." Yet for pay purposes school
psychologists/psychological examiners are grouped with Elementary
Principal and Department Head and other Group V "Administrators."
It would appear that the classifications with which the psychological examiners/school psychologists are grouped are supervisory, and a logical inference may be drawn that the parties
intended, by that grouping to treat psychological examiners/
school psychologists also as supervisory personnel.

Juxtaposed

with the legal fact that psychological examiners/school psychologists do not possess the traditional requisites or authorities
of supervisory personnel (for example they neither hire or fire
nor make effective recommendations

thereon)gives rise to a

contractual ambiguity as to whether "supervisory

personnel"

referred to in Article VI Section N, include psychological
examiners/school psychologists.

It is well settled that in the

event of a contractual ambiguity, clarification as to the parties
intent and the meaning of the contract is found in past practice.
Here the consistent and extensive past practice since at least
1968 has been to accord the expense allowance to psychological
examiner/school psychologist thereby making Article VI Section
N applicable to employees in those classfications.
that circumstance

And under

that practice is binding on both parties as

-4both evidence and a tangible expression of how they intended
to contractually

treat psychological examiners/school

psychologists.
Alternatively, under the Board's theory of the case the
grievance must also be granted.

The Board is correct in

stating that a past practice which is inconsistent with the
clear language of the contract may be unilaterally
at any time upon appropriate notice.

stopped

Assuming arguendo that

psychological examiners/school psychologists are not "supervisory personnel" the Board has the right to unilaterally
terminate the car expense allowance even though it has paid
that allowance for an extended number of years.

Where the

clear language of the contract and a past practice are
mutually

inconsistent either side, upon appropriate notice,

may require return and resort to the contract language.
However in doing so, and assuming the applicability of this
rule to this case, the Board must apply the contract uniformly even handedly and non-discriminatorily
similarly situated.

to all employees

In this case the Board failed to do that.

By letter dated September, 1975 the Acting Superintendent of Schools notified the Association that psychological
examiners/school psychologists and social workers were not
entitled to the expense allowance set forth in Article VI
Section N and that payment would be discontinued.

The Board

discontinued payment to the psychological examined/school

-5psycholegists but did not discontinue paying the expense allowance to social workers.

In short though the Board deemed that

both groups of employees had been paid the expense allowance in
error and contrary to the contract and that payment would be
discontinued for both groups, only one group lost the benefit anc
the other continued to receive it.

At the hearing the Board

could offer no reasonable or justifiable explanation for its
failure to apply this determination to both groups equally as it
said it would in its letter to the Association September 8, 1975.
Obviously the Board's inconsistent application of its determination constitutes discrimination against the psychological
examiners/school psychologists.

A discriminatory termination of

a past practice, even where the practice is inconsistent with the
clear language of the contract, cannot be sustained.
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons the Association's
grievance is granted.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
makes the following AWARD:
The Board of Education violated Article VI
Section N of the collective bargaining agreement by failing to pay psychological examiners/
school psychologists the expenses set forth
therein for the months March through June, 1976.
The Board is directed to make those payments.

V
Schmertz
Arbitrator
p
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DATED: November 2^", 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ° "
On this twenty -seperfd day of November, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowled to me that he
executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
City National Printing Company
East
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Central Connecticut Printing
Pressman, Assistants' And Offset
Workers' Union, No. 401

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Keith Dubay? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Bristol,
Connecticut on May 6, 1976 at which time Mr. Dubay hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant", and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath, and the

contractual tripartite arbitration board were waived.
The grievant's act of tearing up a warning notice in front
of the foreman who gave it to him, and in the presence of other
employees was a seriously improper act, and cannot be excused.
It constituted defiance of managerial authority and could be
construed as insubordination.

However I am persuaded that the

grievant did it in a moment of anger and because he thought the
issuance of a written warning (for some alleged offence of the
previous day) was unwarranted.
who is

I am satisfied that the grievant,

a young man and who other than this and a few other

attitudinal problems has been a good worker, now recognizes that

-2his act was wrong and impermissible, and that any problems he
may have on the job must be referred to the Union and handled
under the grievance procedures of the contract.

Under those

circumstances I believe he should be given another chance to
show that his conduct can comport with his abilities, and that
he can maintain a satisfactory record of work, attitude and
conduct.

I believe and expect that a disciplinary suspension

rather than discharge, will adequately serve that end.

It

sustains the supervisory authority of the foreman; it penalizes
the grievant for his misconduct; and it places him on express
notice that future misconduct would be grounds for dismissal.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator under the arbitration agreement between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Keith Dubay is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated without back pay. The
period of time between his discharge and
his restoration to work, a period of about
four months, shall be deemed the disciplinary
suspension and so noted in his employment
record. He is expressly warned that future
acts of misconduct or other violations would
be grounds for dismissal. For that reason
this Arbitrator retains jurisdiction in
this matter.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 10, 1976
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this tenth day of May, 1976 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

_

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW
Case #12 30 0242 75
and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

In accordance with Article V of the collective bargaining agreement dated January 7, 1974 between the above named
parties the Undersigned was designated to hear and decide a dispute relating to the grievance of Chester Young.
A hearing was held at the Company offices in West
Hartford, Connecticut on December 16, 1975 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union contends that Mr. Young, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant", was denied a promotional bid to the job
Inspector-Salvage-Rework, though he was the senior bidder.

The

Company awarded the job to Joseph Bouchard who is junior to the
grievant by almost eighteen years.

The Union charges a violation

of Article VII Section 14 of the contract, the pertinent parts
of which read:
"The Company will fill....vacancies first
from among those applicants actively in
the employ of the Company who have the

-2ability to do the work required,
on the basis of seniority first
within the Department, then within the Company,
(Ability to
perform the work required shall
be construed to mean that the
employee has the ability and skills
to meet the job requirements when
assigned to them)."
The Union contends that the grievant
ability to do

also had the

the work of the job for which he bid within the

meaning of the foregoing contract provision.

Alternatively the

Union argues that if the grievant did not possess the requisite
ability, neither did Bouchard, and that the Company's award of
the job to the latter violated the seniority provisions of the
foregoing contract clause.
The Company's position is that both the grievant and
Bouchard lacked the ability to perform the work.

(Indeed, after

finally posting the job for bids, which the Company concedes it
did tardily, it officially denied

the bids of the grievant and

Bouchard on the grounds that both lacked the ability required.)
It is the Company's position that it has no obligation to the
senior bidder if that bidder lacks the requisite ability, and
if, as here, there were no bidders qualified or possessed of
the required ability, the Company has no further contractual
obligations either to the Union or to the bidders, and could
fill the job any way it wished.

Under that circumstance the

Company asserts, it could have filled the job with a new hire,
or anyone of its present employees, including Bouchard,

-3irrespective of seniority, without violating the contract.

In

short the Company argues that if the senior bidder and all other
bidders lack the requisite ability, neither they nor the Union
may complain how or with whom the job vacancy is filled.
I will not substitute my judgement for that of the
Company with regard to its determination that both the grievant
and Bouchard lacked the ability to perform the job.

(Therefore

it is unnecessary for me to consider the "on the job experience"
which Bouchard obtained during the period of time he was assigned the duties, when the Company should have but failed to post
the job

for bids).

However I do not agree with the Company

that it is free to fill the job with a junior unqualified bidder
merely because the senior bidder is also unqualified.
There are instances in which a particular act by an
employer may not be precisely violative of the explicit contract
language, and yet be violative of the purpose and spirit of that
language.

That is the case here.

The intent of Section 14 is

to make available to senior employees promotional opportunities
or job vacancies provided they have the requisite ability.

The

other side of the coin is that junior employees are not entitled
to promotional opportunities or to fill vacancies over senior
employees unless they have the ability to do the work and the
senior applicants do not.

Clearly Section 14 sets up a priority

in favor of those with seniority; permitting a junior employee
to progress ahead of an employee with greater seniority only

-4where the junior employee alone has the ability.

Implicit,

in my judgement, is a prohibition on promoting a junior employee
over a senior employee when the junior employee does not possess!
the required ability as in the instant case.

For Bouchard to

preempt the grievant's bid and to gain a higher level position,
when, by the Company's own determination, he lacked the ability
for that promotion, is simply incongruous with and unjustified
under the explicit and implicit priority structure negotiated
by the parties in Section 14 of the contract.
I agree with the late Arbitrator I. Robert Feinberg
who stated in his decision on grievance no. 67-300, dated June
18, 1969; (under contract language materially similar)
"If none of the applicants possess
demonstrated ability as defined in
Section 14 of Article VII, it does
not follow that seniority may be disregarded. The agreement, in essence,
provides two tests, one of demonstrated
ability and one of seniority. If the
applicants are equal with respect to
'demonstrated ability' or lack of it,
and the Company fills the job nevertheless, seniority must be applied
"
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case the Company could have legitimately
refused to fill the job with either the grievant or Bouchard,
inasmuch as both lacked ability.

It could have filled it in-

stead with some other employee or even a new hire who possessed
ability.

But the moment it selected Bouchard, it violated the

seniority rights of the grievant and the seniority provisions
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of Section 14 of Article VII.

As between those two employees

neither had a claim on the job based on ability, but clearly
the grievant had a greater contractual claim or right to the
promotion, based on seniority.
The appropriate remedy in my view under the circumstances where the Company had no original obligation to fill
the job with either the grievant or Bouchard, is to give the
Company some options.

It may remove Bouchard, and replace him

with an employee who possesses ability.
and leave the job vacant.

It may remove Bouchard

Or it may remove Bouchard and re-

place him with the grievant.

But, unless the parties are in

mutual agreement, Bouchard may not remain in the job so long as
the grievant seeks it.

Under the particular circumstances of

this case I conclude that a retroactive pay increase to the
grievant if he replaces Bouchard is not appropriate.

Rather,

if the grievant is placed on the job, he shall receive the rate
of pay of that job from the date he assumes it.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator under
the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:

-6The Company violated Article VII,
Section 14 of the contract when it
awarded the job of Inspector-SalvageRework to the junior employee Joseph
Bouchard whom the Company had deemed
did not possess the ability to do the
work required. The Company shall remove Bouchard from the position and
replace him, if it fills the job,
either with the grievant, Chester Young,
or with some other employee who possesses
the ability to do the work required.
There shall be no retroactive pay
adjustment.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 5, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) '"
On this fifth day of January, 1976, before
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
same.

me personally
known to me
the foreexecuted the

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

Local

1500

R.C.I.A.

- and -

AWARD

King Kullen Grocery Company, Inc

Case #1330 1404 75

The stipulated issue is:
Was there good cause for the discharge
of Lauren Rose, Dorothy Becktold and
JoAnn Wahl? If not what shall be the
remedy?

A hearing was held on December 11, 1975 at which time
the three aforementioned individuals and representatives of
the above named parties appeared. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

I see no useful purpose to an

Opinion in this matter.

Accordingly, based on the record before me and having
duly considered the proofs and allegations of the parties and
having been duly sworn, the Undersigned, duly designated as
the Arbitrator, makes the following AWARD:
There was good cause for the discharge
of Lauren Rose and Dorothy Becktold.

There was not good cause for the discharge of JoAnn Wahl. Miss Wahl shall

-2be reinstated with back pay, less
unemployment insurance she received,
and earnings, if any, that she received
from other employment during the period
of her discharge.

E. J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 5, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) S " "
On this fifth day of January, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

October 12, 1976

In the matter of the arbitration
between
INTERIM OPINION
Local 702, IATSE and

of the
Cineffects Color Laboratories
Permanent Arbitrator

In hhe instant case the Union contends that the reference to
"40 hours" in Article 29 (a) and 30 (a) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement includes overtime, hours worked as well
as straight time hours worked up to 40 hours worked in a week,
for payment of Welfare and Pension contributions to
Motion picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 ) Pension Fund
and Motion picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund.
The Company does not dispute that contention. Therefore, in
this proceeding, there is no issue before the Arbitrator over
the interpretation of the foregoing contract provisions.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Company has offered to
payments to said Funds retroactive to May 1,
,.
The Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator, refers the foregoing
Company offer to the Trustees of both Funds, and retains
jurisdiction pending wo'rd of action by the Trustees.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Perma/ent Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 420, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0201 75

and
Connecticut Light and Power Company

In accordance with Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement dated June 1, 1975 between the Connecticut Light
and Power Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
and Local 420, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", the Undersigned
was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Was there just cause to impose on June 3,
1975 the penalty of discharge upon employees
Robert Cullen and Albert W. Lebel? If not
what should the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Meriden, Connecticut on December
1, 1975 at which time Messrs. Cullen and Lebel, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievants", and representatives of the Union
and Company, appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

hearing briefs were filed.

Post-
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The essential facts are not in dispute.

A group of some

twenty-three Company employees, including the grievants, were
found to be tampering with their electric and/or gas meters,
thereby reducing their respective utility bills.

All but the

grievants were penalized with disciplinary suspensions of eight
weeks and a requirement to make restitution.

The grievants

were discharged.
The grievants admit the offense.

The Union does not

contend, generally, that meter tampering is not a discharge
offense.

Rather, in the instant case, it relies on the funda-

mental rule of "even-handed discipline", asserting that for the
same offense, the grievants should not have been punished to any
greater extent than the others.
The Company's case is based on its contention that the
grievants were not "similarly situated" to the other employees
who engaged in meter tampering.

It distinguishes the grievants

from the others by a prior "act of dishonesty", which each
grievant committed and for which each was disciplined.

The other

approximately twenty-one employees, argues the Company had no
prior disciplinary offenses involving "dishonesty".
It is well settled that where a group of employees commit
the same offense, some may be more severely disciplined than
others, if that latter offense is part of a more egregious or
unsatisfactory prior disciplinary record.

Thus where a greater
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disciplinary penalty is imposed on the employee with the more
unsatisfactory employment record, the rule requiring even-handed
discipline for the same offense is not breached.
In the instant case I accept the distinction which the
Company makes.

I do not consider it particularly material to

examine the magnitude or extent of the prior acts of alleged
dishonesty committed by each of the grievants.

(Cullen siphoned

some gasoline from a Company vehicle for his own use, and a fire
resulted destroying the Company vehicle.

Lebel misused the

Company's finance and payroll deduction plan.) What is material
is that each was disciplined for those respective offenses,
Cullen by an eighteen and one-half day suspension and Lebel by
payment of certain carrying charges on his purchase and a ban
on his use of the payroll deduction plan for one year, and
neither grieved the charge or the disciplinary penalty imposed.
What is more significantly material is the fact that as part of
the discipline each received a letter which inter alia advised
that "further violations of Company practice.... policies and
procedures could result in discharge."
It has been established by concession, admission or by
the undisputed evidence, that at the time both grievants were
disciplined for their prior offenses, and at the time that they
received their respective letters warning them about the
consequences of further violations, they were tampering with

-4their meters.

Though expressly informed that their jobs were

in jeopardy if they committed future violations, they continued
the tampering and continued to draw the illegal benefits therefrom.

This blatant disregard of an express warning; to continue

to pursue a course of misconduct as serious as meter tampering
despite the prior discipline and warning, is an act of defiance
which legitimately distinguishes the grievants from the other
twenty-one employees.

And this distinction is substantively

adequate and significant to justify the more severe penalty.
Inasmuch as meter tampering generally would be a discharge
offense, irrespective of an employee's prior record, I cannot
fault the Company's decision to discharge the grievants while
tempering that penalty for those whose prior records were either
clear or not as serious.
That there may have been one or two other employees within the group who had committed a prior disciplinary offense,
does not change the foregoing conclusion.

The prior offenses

of that or those employees were not as serious or relevant as
the prior offenses of the grievants.

But even if otherwise, it

would mean only that the Company could have discharged one or
two others, not that the grievants would thereby be entitled to
or qualify for the lesser penalty.
One final word of a purely advisory nature.

Noxv

that

the Company's distinction has been accepted and its right to

-5discharge the grievants upheld (and the Arbitrator has expressed
the view that meter tampering is a discharge offense regardless
of past record), it may wish to give consideration to the
grievants1

long service (over twenty years) with the Company as

a possible mitigating factor.

In its sole discretion, and not

part of my Award in this case, the Company may wish to give the
grievants one final chance, by reducing the discharges to long
term suspensions (in excess of the eight weeks imposed on the
others) plus restitution.

I would recommend that the Company

consider that action.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause to impose on June
3, 1975 the penalty of discharge upon
Robert Cullen and Albert W. Lebel.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATE: January 5, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) " '
On this fifth day of January, 1976, before me personally
Game and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 584 IBT

OPINION
and

AND

AWARD

Case #1330 1572 75

Rainbow Dairies

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Theodore Rothke? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 30, 1975 at which time
Mr. Rothke, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant is charged with "Dishonesty" within the
meaning of Section 13A of the contract.

The Employer's allega-

tion is based on what its security officer testified he saw the
grievant do during the early morning hours (about 4:45 AM) of
September 12, 1975.
Absent direct corroborating evidence, or other evidence
in support of the security officer's testimony, I am not prepared to conclude that his testimony is any more probative than
that of the grievant, who has been employed by this Employer for
almost five years and who, based on the record before me, has
had no prior formal disciplinary difficulties.
It is possible that the security officer was mistaken
as to what he saw in the darkness of that morning, and mistook
certain products for others when he removed what he thought were

-2"extra" Half and Half cases from the grievant's truck.

There-

fore the relevant evidence is not only conflicting but offsetting, and hence indeterminative one way or the other.
The instant record does not establish the grievant's
innocence.

But that is neither the issue nor the burden in

this case.

Rather, the Employer has not established the

grievant's culpability by the requisite standard of clear and
convincing evidence, and therefore has not met the burden required to sustain the disciplinary action.
In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary for me to
deal with the procedural requirements of the last paragraph of
Section 13.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
Just cause has not been established
for the discharge of Theodore Rothke.
He shall be reinstated with full benefits
and back pay, less earnings, if any, from
other employment during the period of his
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 13, 1976
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this thirteenth day of January, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Glass Bottle Blowers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0335 76

and
Continental Can Company

In accordance with Article 9 of the collective bargaining
agreement effective June 1, 1974 between Glass Bottle Blowers
Association of the United States and Canada hereinafter referred
to as the "Union" and Continental Can Company, Plastic Container
Division, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", the Undersigned
was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Collie Sparrow, and if not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on July 29, 1976
at which time Mr. Sparrow, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the Union and Company, appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The Company filed a post-hearing

brief.
The Company's charge is that on December 10, 1975 the
grievant insubordinately and profanely refused to comply with an

-2order from his supervisor that he close a plant overhead door.
The Company contends that this act of insubordination, together
with the grievant's prior disciplinary record during the same year
which included other violations of Company rules, warranted his
dismissal.
The grievant denies the charge.

The Union on his behalf

argues that he did not refuse to carry out the order but rather
was unable to comply because he did not have a piece of equipment
necessary to close the overhead door, and that in any event the
door was justifiably opened and left open by the grievant in
compliance with the request of certain employees who complained
of the presence

of fumes from a heat-treat fire on the bottle

line which had taken place earlier.
The only non-hearsay evidence regarding the events of
December 10, 1975 is the testimony of the grievant and his supervisor Bobby Kennard.

The balance of the testimony is by witnesses

who were not present at and did not have personal knowledge of the
incident.

The Union did not offer testimony by any of the

employees working that day who, it is contended, asked the
grievant to open the door because of lingering fumes from the
fire on the bottle line nor were any of them called to corroborate
the grievant's version.

The hearsay testimony cannot be deemed

determinative, and the grievant's assertions regarding why the
door was opened, his argument in apparent justification for leaving it open, and his allegation that he didn't refuse, but couldn'
close the door without a fork lift, are not supported by testimony

_o _

from witnesses who either were available to testify but were not
called, or whose unavailability was not explained.
As between the testimony of Kennard and that of the
grievant, I accept the former as the accurate version.

I find

no reason in the record why the supervisor would misrepresent
what took place or falsely testify.

His testimony at the

arbitration hearing was forthright, precise, and unequivocal.
Contrary-wise the testimony of the grievant was unsure, imprecise
and hence unpersuasive.
Based on the probative evidence in the record I conclude
that the grievant refused to carry out the order of his supervisor to close an overhead door; that his refusal included his
abusive and disrespectful use of profanity to the supervisor that
went beyond the bounds of "shop talk"; that there was no realistic
or legitimate safety reason why the overhead door should remain
open; and even if some fumes were still present from the fire
it did not justify his refusal to do what he was instructed to do
Standing alone, the foregoing act, though obviously
insubordination, might not be sufficient to impose the ultimate
penalty of discharge on an employee with twelve and one-half
years of service.

But this offense does not stand alone.

During

the same year the grievant had been previously "talked to" and
officially disciplined with a warning for other serious violations
of plant rules including a prior act of insubordination which
neither he nor the Union grieved.

In view of the contract

-4provision vitiating disciplinary penalties which are more than
one year old, the grievant's prior disciplinary offenses within
the same year and hence inside of the one year period, are
relevant and must be considered in determining whether the
penalty of dismissal was proper.

Considering the events of

December 10, 1975 and the grievant's prior disciplinary offenses
in that year, I am constrained to hold that the Company's
decision to impose the penalty of discharge was neither excessive
nor improper.

For the Arbitrator to consider a lesser penalty

under the circumstances would be for him to substitute his
judgement for the judgement of the Company, reasonably exercised
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Collie Sparrow was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 5, 1976
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fifth day of October, 1976 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD
and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

In my Award dated December 18, 1969 between the above
named parties I upheld the Union's grievance and directed that
"the complement of the Gevachrome machine shall be three (3) men.1

The question now posed is how the machine should be operated if it runs continuously through regular meal and break periods
The Union contends that the Company must obtain another operator
to relieve any of the regular operators during meals or break
periods to ensure a three-man complement at all times.

The

Company contends that for meals and break periods the assigned
crew members should individually relieve each other, and that
the machine may be run during those periods with only two operators present.
My Award of December 18, 1969 does not deal explicitly with
the instant question, and the contract is silent on this particular problem.
The Union relies principally on "past practice", asserting
that the practice has been for each member of the crew to be
relieved for meals and break periods by an operator obtained from
outside the crew, and that when the machine operated through those
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periods there were three operators present at all times.

The

Company disputes this "past practice", contending that until
recently the machine was shut down during meal and break periods
and that the dispute arose only recently when the Company decided
to operate the machine continuously through meal and break periods
as well as during regular operating hours.
The testimony on "past practice" is sharply conflicting,
offsetting and hence indeterminative of the issue presented.
The Union offered testimony that for some time the machine has
been operated through meal and break periods and that a fourth
operator was obtained from elsewhere to replace whichever member
of the regular crew was at a meal or taking a break.

On the other

hand the Company offered equally probative testimony that the
machine has been shut-down during meal and break periods; or that
there was not enough work to run the machine through the meal
period; or that occasionally if the machine ran through the meal
and break periods the regular three man crew remained on and the
Company paid overtime for work performed through those periods.
Accordingly, based on the testimony in the record, I am unable
to decide whether there was a consistent practice relevant to
the issue before me, and therefore I am unable to direct,
pursuant to Section 17(b), that the "present method of operation
continue without change."
However I am persuaded that the issue may be resolved by
a logical, and proper, albeit inferential interpretation of my
Opinion accompanying the aforementioned Award of December 18, 1969,

-3together with a practice that is undisputed.

In that case the

Union sought manning comparability between the Gevachrome machine
and developing machines #1, 2 and 3.

In establishing manning

comparability between the Gevachrome machine and developing
machines #1, 2 and 3, I stated:
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached
applicator. It is undisputed by the Company
that other color developing machines with
applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines #1, #2 and #3, are run with a
crew of three when one strand is developed and
with a crew of five for two strands. The testimony of Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the
Union and Company respectively, coincide on
one crucial point, and that is that by agreement between the parties, color developing
machines with applicators are and have been
run with a crew of no less than three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether
this latter referred to agreement applies to
the Gevachrome machine, on which the applicator
is utilized only infrequently. I conclude that
it does. (Emphasis added).
In other words, in that Opinion, I determined that the
manning of the Gevachrome machine should be the same as the
manning on developing machines #1, #2 and #3.

In the instant

case, there is one past practice which is undisputed, and that
is that developing machines #1, #2 and #3 operate through meal
and break periods and the operators of developing machines #1,
#2 and #3 relieve each other during those times, thereby reducing the complement on those machines by one member during those
periods.

The import and intent of my prior Award was to treat

the Gevachrome machine and developing machines #1, 2 and 3

-4similarly for purposes of manning.

To grant the Union's

grievance in the instant case would be to change that similarity,
by according the operators of the Gevachrome, and the Union on
their behalf, a greater right or benefit than has been extended
to the operators of developing machines #1,#2 and #3 by practice
and under my prior Award.

As indicated, I find no contractual

or "past practice" basis to support a distinction between the
way the Gevachrome machine is operated continuously during meal
and break periods and the way machines #1, #2 and #3 are operated during similar periods.

Therefore the similarity or "parity"

of manning which was established by my Award of December 18, 1969
shall continue to obtain, and the manning of the Gevachrome
machine during meal and break periods shall be handled in the
same manner as has been done on developing machines #1, #2 and
#3.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, Permanent
Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance is denied. When a
member of the three-man complement of the
Gevachrome machine takes a meal or break
period, he shall be relieved during those
periods by the remaining members of the
crew. The Company is not obligated to obtain
a replacement from another location.

-5The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by
the Union.

Erie J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 29, 1976
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-ninth day of November, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 119
AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #14 30 0867 76 M/H

and
General Electric Company
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of John C. Endres? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Mr. Endres, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", was
discharged after receiving a fourth written warning notice within a twelve month period.

The Company rules provide that an

employee is subject to discharge under that circumstance.
The Union does not dispute the propriety of the Company's
rule nor its dissemination to and among the employees including
the grievant.

Nor does the Union challenge the grievant's first

three warning notices within the undisputed twelve month period.
The issue is simply whether the fourth warning notice was proper,
If so the grievant's discharge must be upheld.
The fourth warning notice for "gross misconduct" is based
on the Company's charge that the grievant left work during his
regular shift without notice to and permission of supervision.
I accept as accurate the testimony of the foremen involved who
deny that the grievant informed them of a toothache and his
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necessity to go to the dentist.

I do not accept as credible the

grievant's assertion that he informed his foremen of his condition and either expressly or tacitly obtained their permission
to leave work before the end of the shift to go to the dentist.
Where as here, credibility is involved, the grievant's prior
record, which includes the three aforementioned warning notices
for "failing to follow instructions", "abusive language to
supervision", "absent from work station without permission" is
not supportive of the truth of his version of the incident leading
to the fourth warning notice.

Also, I find no reason why foremen

Friddell and Piazzi would falsely testify that the grievant did
not advise them of his dental problem or seek their permission
to leave work early.

Finally and perhaps most determinative is

that I cannot accept the grievant's testimony regarding his need
to go to the dentist.

Considering his statement that he was in

extreme pain and could not continue at work (and indeed did not
even want to come to work that day at all) I do not think it
reasonable or believable that, as he testified, he went to the
dentist, but seeing the dentist occupied with a single patient,
left, and went home without informing the dentist

of his

problem or leaving word that he was there despite his admission
that no other patients were waiting for treatment.
Considering the grievant's prior relevant disciplinary
record, the testimony of the two foremen involved, the grievant's
illogical testimony regarding his visit to the dentist, I am
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constrained to conclude that he left work on his own initiative
without proper notice to supervision and without obtaining the
requisite permission.
was proper.

Accordingly the fourth warning notice

Under the Company's working rules, his receipt of

a fourth warning notice within a twelve month period, justifies
his dismissal.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD in accordance with the expedit
ed provisions of Article XV of the collective bargaining
agreement:
The discharge of John C. Endres was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 17, 1976

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Hartford Principals' and Supervisors
Association, Local No. 22, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0274 76

and
Board of Education of The City of
Hartford

In accordance with Article V Paragraph C of the collective
bargaining agreement dated May 13, 1976 between Hartford
Principals' and Supervisors' Association, Local 22, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Association" and The Board of
Education of The City of Hartford, hereinafter referred to as
the "Board", the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide a dispute between the Association and the Board
involving the grievance of Mr. Richard Morris.
A hearing was held at the offices of the Board on December
20, 1976 at which time Mr. Morris, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the Association and the
Board appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
The pertinent section of Article V (Grievance Procedures)
reads:
A grievance shall mean a complaint by
an employee that he/she has been subjected to arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory policy or practice
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The Association contends that the Board's refusal or failure
to change the grievant's title from Acting District Chairperson,
Social Studies, Weaver High School-Middle School District to
District Chairperson, Social Studies, Weaver High School-Middle
School District after he met the statutory requirements for
the latter position was "arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory1
within the meaning of the foregoing contractual definition of a
grievance.
The Association has made out a case of arbitrariness which
was not adequately rebutted by the Board.
The dictionary definition of "arbitrary" is unreasonable,
unsupported, without adequate notice and treatment on a basis
other than individual merit (The Random House Dictionary of
The English Language: Unabridged Edition.)
The grievant was appointed Acting District Chairperson
effective October 1, 1974.

It is undisputed that the only

reason the job title was conditioned by the word "Acting" was
because at that time he had not yet completed his fifth teaching
year, a statutory requirement for permanent appointment as an
Administrator.

The Association contends that sometime in May

of 1975 the grievant was promised by Mr. Henderson Duval the
Assistant Administrator for Personnel and Labor Relations that
the appointment would be made permanent and the word "Acting"
dropped from the title when the grievant had completed his fifth
teaching year.

Duval concedes he told the grievant that upon
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completion of the fifth teaching year a recommendation would be
made to the Board that he be appointed permanently to the
District Chairperson position.

I view these two versions as

distinctions without a difference.

I am persuaded that Duval's

statement to the grievant was authoritative and that though he
may have lacked the technical authority to assure a change in
title he possessed the apparent authority to do so.

Based on

practice, Duval's assurance, whether a direct promise to give
the grievant the permanent title or to make a recommendation to
the Board through the Superintendent of Schools, amounted to the
same thing.

Duval candidly testified that at the time, recommend

ations which he drafted for the Superintendent of Schools for
submission to the Board were regularly accepted by the Superintendent and invariably acted upon affirmatively by the Board.
Indeed, it is undisputed that another employee, similarly
situated as to job assignment, but who possessed all of the
statutory requirements for appointment as a chairperson was
recommended and approved for that appointment at the time that
the grievant was made an Acting Chairperson.

In short, it is

clear, and indeed it was conceded, that had the grievant met
the statutory requirements in October of 1974, he also would
have been recommended for and would have been appointed to his
District Chairperson job unconditionally. Consequently, based
upon the practices and circumstances in effect in October of
1974 and May of 1975, I conclude that an assurance by Duval

-4that the grievant would be recommended for full appointment when
he acquired his fifth teaching year was synonymous with an
assurance that the grievant would receive that appointment when
he met that condition.
Thereafter, in June of 1975 the grievant completed his fifth
teaching year.

But from that date to the present he has not bee

appointment as Chairperson, but has remained Acting District
Chairperson.

This is so despite written recommendations from

Duval to the Administrator of Personnel for Labor Relations and
the written recommendation of the Principal of the Middle School
that the word "Acting" be dropped from the grievant's title.
Also it is so despite the fact that the grievant has bid for
the District Chairperson's job, which he has held all along on
an Acting basis, in response to job postings of June 28,
September 27, November 12 and 16 of 1976, under Article VII
Paragraph B No. 4 of the contract.
It is significant that the grievant's bids in response to
each of these postings were not rejected.

Rather his applica-

tions were deferred, and re-postings of the job opening were
ordered by the Superintendent of Schools.

The grievant's bids

were not rejected because he lacked qualifications for the job
or on other substantive grounds.

Nor is there any evidence in

the record that his capabilities to perform the full job are in
any way challenged.

The sole explanation of the Board for not

acting upon the grievant's job bid, was that the Superintendent

-5of Schools sought to obtain a greater number of applicants for
consideration.

And hence, rather than acting upon the grievant'

bid (together with the one or two others who also bid,) ordered
subsequent and renewed postings for the job.

Nor is it the

Board's position that it did not act upon the grievant's bids
because it decided not to fill the job on a permanent basis.
On the contrary, representatives of the Board conceded that the
Board wished and intended to appoint a District Chairperson.
The various job postings in the year 1976, subsequent to the
grievant's acquisition of a fifth teaching year, are evidence
of that intent.
I conclude therefore that the sole reason the grievant has
not been appointed as the District Chairperson with the word
"Acting" deleted from his title, is that the Superintendent of
Schools has wanted more candidates to respond to the job posting
I do not consider this to be a fair, reasonable, or justifiable
reason to deny the grievant a job which he has been satisfactorily performing since 1974 on an acting basis, and which, since
June of 1975 he is statutorily qualified to assume.

For the

Superintendent of Schools to unilaterally defer evaluating and
acting upon bids submitted under the bidding provisions of the
contract, and to instead unilaterally direct subsequent and repostings of the same job vacancy in order to get a greater
number of candidates, could constructively frustrate the purpose
and intent of the posting and bidding procedures of Article VII

-6of the contract.

It would mean that the Superintendent of Schools

could unilaterally by-pass a qualified bidder merely because he
wished to examine the qulifications of more candidates, even
though there were not multiple bids.

I consider that unreasonable

and potentially discriminatory, so far as any qualified bidder
is concerned, and, in my judgement, inconsistent with the purpose
and intent of the posting and bidding provisions of the contract.
The aforementioned memoranda recommending and requesting the
deletion of the word "Acting" from the grievant's title were also
not dealt with in a reasonable or justifiable manner.

The

Superintendent of Schools responded that the requests could not
be granted because only the Board had the power to make a
permanent appointment, and the grievant's name had not been
submitted to the Board for that purpose.
beg the question.

Obviously those responses

They do not answer the critical question of

why, after June of 1975, the grievant's name was not submitted
to the Board for a change in title, in accordance with the assurances given to him by an authoritative representative of the
Board.

Clearly those responses had nothing to do with the merits

of the grievant's application nor do they in any way challenge
the satisfactory nature of the job he has been performing in an
acting capacity or his substantive qualifications for permanent
appointment.
For the foregoing reasons I conclude that the refusal or
failure of the Board to delete the word "Acting" from the
grievant's title is unreasonable, unsupported by adequate reason

-7or motive and is treatment on a basis other than merit.

In short

the Board has been arbitrary.
Remaining is the question of remedy.

The Board asserts that

under Article II of the contract a permanent appointment of a
Chairperson is an exclusive prerogative of the Board and may not
be ordered by an Arbitrator.

I conclude otherwise.

Article II

in pertinent part, relating to the prerogatives of the Board
states that those:
....prerogatives are not subject to
delegation in whole or in part, except that the same shall not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with or
in violation of any of the terms and
conditions of this Agreement. No action
taken by the Board with respect to such
prerogatives other than as there
are specified provisions herein elsewhere
contained, shall be subject to the grievance
provisions of this Agreement. (Emphasis added.)
Manifestly

if the Board has acted "arbitrary, capricious or

discriminator(il)y" within the meaning of Article V of the
contract, it has exercised a right, responsibility or prerogative
in a manner inconsistent with or in violation of the Agreement.
And - that action, as it involves a specific provision of the
contract, is therefore subject to the grievance provisions.
Under that circumstance, and having found that the Board
acted arbitrarily, the Arbitrator is empowered to fashion a
remedy that is final and not contingent.

Put another way, the

Board's exclusive prerogative to make permanent appointments of
Chairpersons is lost or waived if the Board acts arbitrarily

-8in the exercise of a right or prerogative.

In that event, the

Arbitrator is empowered by the contract to do what the Board
should have done.

In the instant case he may "reform the

circumstances" and put the grievant in the position he would and
should have been in had the Board not acted arbitrarily.

So,

though the Arbitrator may order the Superintendent of Schools to
affirmatively recommend to the Board that it appoint the grievant
to the District Chairperson job, the Arbitrator may also insure
the affirmative end result by directly ordering the grievant's
appointment.

To guard against further procedural frustrations

of the grievant's substantive and contractual rights I choose
to do the latter.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Robert Morris's job title of Acting
District Chairperson, Social Studies,
Weaver High School-Middle School
District shall be forthwith changed
to District Chairperson, Social Studies,
Weaver High School-Middle School District,
with such benefits as attach thereto.

DATED: December 23, 1976
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty third day of December, 1976, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Hawthorne Cedar Knolls Federation
of Teachers, Local 1169, New York
State United Teachers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1330 1875 75

and
Hawthorne Cedar Knolls Union Free
School District

In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement dated 1974-1976 between the Board of Education of
Hawthorne Cedar Knolls Union Free School District, hereinafter
referred to as the "Employer" and Local 1169 New York State
United Teachers, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Has the Employer violated Article II of
the collective bargaining agreement by
refusing to recognize the Union as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the teaching assistants employed in the school?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on August
30, 1976 at which time representatives of the Employer and the
Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Article II (Statement of Recognition) reads:
The Union is recognized as the exclusive
bargaining agent of certificated teaching
personnel of the District, exclusive of
the District Principal, other supervisors
and substitutes.

-2The following facts were stipulated by the parties:
1. The first formal contract between the
parties was in 1969. Article II was negotiated in its present form in that contract,
repeated without change in the three successive
contracts of 1970, 1972 and 1974.
2. In 1969 when Article II first appeared,
"certificated teaching personnel" then
employed in the District consisted of teachers
and administrators. At that time there were
employees classified as "teacher aides" who
were not "certificated", (nor could they then
be certificated under the Education Law).
3. Effective February 1, 1971 amendments were
made to the Education Law, which provided,
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the State
Commissioner of Education, for the certification
of "teaching assistants."
4. In negotiations leading to the 1974-1976
contract there was no reference by either side
to "teaching assistants." The Union made no
demand for bargaining unit coverage for employees
in that job classification. Its grievance demanding recognition as the bargaining agent of teaching assistants under Article II was filed in
November, 1975.
The Employer presently employs six teaching assistants,
five of which were certificated under the amended Education Law
in September of 1972.
of

The sixth was certificated in September

1974.
The Union contends that teaching assistants are "certifi-

cated teaching personnel" within the meaning of Article II of
the contract, and hence must be included in the bargaining unit
by operation of that contract clause.

The Union explains that

it had no knowledge of the certification of teaching assistants
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in September of 1972, and hence made no demand to be recognized
as their exlusive bargaining agent in the contract negotiations
leading to the 1974-1976 Agreement.

It asserts that after making

inquiry of the Employer, and within a reasonable time following
receipt of specific information regarding the certificated
status of the six teaching assistants, it made its demand for
bargaining representation, and when that demand was denied
filed the instant grievance.
The Employer does not deny that the teaching assistants
are now certificated under the Education Law, but asserts that
they are not "certificated teaching personnel" within the intent
and meaning of Article II of the collective agreement.

The

Employer argues that Article II, unchanged in successive contracts since its first inclusion in the 1969 Agreement must be
interpreted in accordance with the intent which the parties
placed on it when originally negotiated.

The Employer asserts

that the language, when negotiated, was intended to apply, and
indeed did apply, only to teachers and administrators.

There

were no teaching assistants in 1969, and teaching aides were
non-certificated.

Therefore, both explicitly

and factually,

contends the Employer, the parties mutually understood that the
phrase "certificated teaching personnel" was limited to only
those certificated at the time.

The Employer argues that in

the absence of any subsequent contract discussions between the
parties regarding the language of Article II, together with the

-4undisputed fact that the 1969 contract language has been
perpetuated unvaried in successive contracts, the original
meaning and intent should not be expanded by arbitration,
irrespective of the fact that since September of 1972 teaching
assistants in the District are certificated.

The Employer

concludes that the question of bargaining rights for teaching
assistants, the unit in which they would belong, and the
selection of their bargaining agent are all matters for the
processes of the New York State Public Employment Relations
Board.
From time to time there are arbitration cases, like court
cases in which, as the United States Supreme Court has observed
the bare facts
"....may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers." (Holy Trinity Church v United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459. National Woodworking
Manufacturers Association v NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,
619.)
The instant arbitration is such a case.

That teaching

assistarts are "certificated" is undisputed, and hence would
appear prima facie to be "within the letter" of the collective
bargaining agreement.

However I am satisfied that teaching

assistants, albeit now certificated, were not intended by the
parties to be included as "certificated teaching personnel"
under the provisions of Article II of the collective agreement
And I conclude they should not now, by arbitration, be included
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despite the "letter" of the recognition language.

It is

acknowledged that when Article II was originally negotiated in
1969 it covered only teachers and administrators.

Thereafter

there were no further discussions whatsoever between the parties
regarding any changed meaning or application of that contract
language.

The fact that teaching assistants became certificated

in 1972 does not, in my/ view, mean that the parties changed the
meaning and purpose of the language of Article II.

Nor do I

believe, absent any discussions between the parties on the subject or demands in the course of contract negotiations, that
a change in the Education Law, over which the parties had no
control, should bring about a new, expanded and different
interpretation of the recognition clause of the collective
agreement.

In short, where as here, the meaning and intent of

Article II. particularly with regard to "certificated teaching
personnel" was jointly understood to be limited to teachers
and administrators, that intent should continue to be the
correct interpretation, unless by subsequent agreement or conduct
of the parties a new or different interpretation succeeds it.
I find no such agreement or conduct here.

On the contrary, it

was a change in the Education Law and new rules promulgated by
the Education Commissioner which created a new situation
not dealt with in contract negotiations.

That changed situation,

separate from and independent of any agreement or conduct of

-6the parties cannot provide a basis to infer or impute a new
intent to or a different interpretation of Article II.
I find a significant difference between the instant
case and a private sector labor dispute in which subsequent
to the execution of a collective bargaining agreement an
employer adds new job classifications which the Union claims
belong within the bargaining unit because they are "production
or maintenance" classifications within the meaning of the
recognition clause.

Obviously, where the recognition clause

grants a union exclusive bargaining rights over "production
and maintenance" jobs, newly created job classifications or
newly filled job assignments which factually fall within
"production and maintenance" categories, fall within the bargaining unit under the union's jurisdiction, and the incumbents
in those jobs are subject to any union security clause.

But

in the instant case, unlike the private sector example, the
Employer did not unilaterally and discretionarily certificate
the teaching assistant.

It was not this Employer who

"established the new jobs", nor did he have control over or
influence in the decision to do so.

Consequently, while the

private sector employer must assume contractual responsibility
for new job classifications which he established, I cannot
hold this Employer responsibile for what the Education
Commissioner and a change in the Education Law did.
For all the foregoing reasons teaching assistants,
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though certificated under the Education Law, are not
"certificated teaching personnel of the District" within the
intention and meaning of Article II of the collective bargain
ing agreement.

It should be clear however that this determ-

ination is without prejudice of the rights of the parties in
any proceeding on this subject before the New York State
Public Employment Relations Board or in any other appropriate
forum.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
Without prejudice to the rights of the
parties in any proceeding before the
Public Employment Relations Board or in
any other appropriate forum, the Hawthorne
Cedar Knolls Union Free School District has
not violated Article II of the collective
bargaining agreement by refusing to recognize
the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the teaching assistants employed in the
school.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 27, 1976
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty seventh day of September, 1976, before
me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described'in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York Lithographers & Photo-Engravers
Union, Local IP, GAIU, AFL-CIO

AWARD

and
Intaglio Service Corp.

By mutual agreement of the parties, the undersigned was
designated as arbitrator to resolve a dispute which arose between
them.

A hearing was held on Tuesday, June 22, 1976 at 250 Broadway
Issue
The issue before the arbitrator is whether the seniority

provision in the labor agreement between the parties (Article XII,
Sec. 12.11) shall be applied retroactively with specific reference to the priority of termination in the contemplated

layoff

to Frank R. Sellitto and Rudolph Leidl.

Award
From the oral testimony adduced at the trial, and particularly the documentary testimony, disclosing that the Union
approved a seniority list with no retroactive application, it is
clear that the seniority provision involved was intended to be
applied on that basis and, in fact was so applied months after
the first seniority amendment was agreed upon (April 1, 1972).
I find that the list, as approved, constitutes the priority
to be applied in the coming layoffs, less the period of time
where the journeymen who broke their service did not perform any
work.
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Therefore, in the specific instance involved, Mr. Leidl,
is deemed to have more seniority than Mr. Sellitto insofar
as the layoffs involved are concerned.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 14, 1976
STATE OF New York ) S S - .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fourteenth day of July, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Watch & Jewelry Workers Union,
Local 147 R.W.D.S.U., AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A75-1320-14

and
Jacoby-Bender, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement effective June 1, 1973 between
the above named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Were the method changes and/or rate
changes established by the Company
in the Heavy Link Department a violation of the contract? If so what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation and at the offices of the Company on September 16, November 3, 1975 and January 21, 1976 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
expressly waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The Union and Company filed post-hearing

briefs.
Following the installation of certain method changes on
certain group incentive jobs in the Heavy Link Department, the
Company restudied and changed the incentive rates on those jobs.
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The Union does not challenge the Company's right to make
method changes.

Its grievance, and its position herein, is

that the Company did not have the right to make overall, total
changes in the incentive rates when the method changes were
relatively minor, and when the effect of the new incentive rates
was a sharp reduction in the earnings of the affected employees.
Considering the foregoing, the instant dispute involves
the rate changes promulgated by the Company not the method
changes which preceded them.

Therefore the method changes alone

did not constitute violations of the contract.
The thrust of the Union's case is that the method changes
involved were simply manual, relatively inconsequential when
compared to the total job procedure, and that to replace the
former incentive rates with new rates affecting the total job
was, because it was broader than the method changes,
any contract authorization
rates.

beyond

to "change", "revise" or "adjust"

In short the Union asserts that the Company utilized

relatively insignificant method changes to "destroy or obliterate
the incentive rate", thereby improperly and sharply reducing the
earnings of the employees.
The Union maintains that accepted incentive plan procedures
allow rate changes, revisions or adjustments only as to that
part of the rate that bears on the particular method change
involved.

Applied to this case, the Union argues that the most

the Company was allowed to do was to modify only that portion
of the rate that previously applied to that portion of the job

-3method which had been changed, with the balance of the rate in this case most of it, inviolate.
The contract does not support the Union's contentions
and theories and the Arbitrator is bound to the contract terms.
Section 10(a)

expressly authorizes the Company to "continue its

present practices with respect to...Oamendment of incentive
rates and production standards."

It goes on to clarify what

those practices are, namely so far as the instant case is
concerned, to establish "separate rates....for each individual
job whether or not that job ever had a rate before...."

Clearly

that contemplates and provides for the establishment of new
incentive rates on jcbs which were or are already on incentive.
Section 10(a) goes on to grant the Company the right to "change
or adjust incentive rates".... at any time during the period of
this agreement."

That provision is not limited to that part of

the job on which there has been a method change nor does it even
require a method change or any other restructuring of the job
procedures as conditions precedent to changes in the incentive
rate.
The Company's authority to make rate changes during the
period of the agreement under Section 10(a)

is limited only by

the Union's right to "request a review of such changed or adjusted
incentive rates", and to grieve and submit to arbitrstion disagreements between the Union and the Company regarding the changed
or adjusted incentive rate, within the time limits prescribed.
The meaning of that proviso is clear and traditional.

It

-4accords the Union an opportunity to challenge the accuracy, in
other words the scientific validity, of the changed or adjusted
incentive rate.

And if there is no agreement on the correctness

or accuracy of the rate or any of its parts, that disagreement
may be grieved and settled by arbitration.

But that proviso

does not restrict the Company's right to unilaterally review,
restudy and change or adjust existing incentive rates.

Instead,

and in short, it permits the Union to challenge the times and
production standards embodied in those new rates after the
Company has made the

changes or modifications.

Moreover, unilateral changes in incentive rates are
explicitly contemplated under Section 10(g) of the contract
"because of changes in method of production or changes in the
construction of tools and dies", subject only to notice by the
Company to the Union and in the event of disagreement on the
validity of the rate, the Union's right to grieve and arbitrate
as provided under Section 10(a).

But again, there is no

contractual restriction on the Company's right to initiate the
"revision" of rates when methods of production have changed,
and there is no

condition that the revision be limited to just

that portion of the job on which a method change has been
introduced.
In view of the unrestricted contract language of Sections
10(a) and 10(g) as to changes, modifications and revisions of
rates, the limitations which the Union seeks may not be implied,
and must be obtained through negotiations, not arbitration.

-5Based on what I consider to be clear contract language,
I am satisified that the Company had the contractual right under
Section 10(a) and 10(g) to change the overall incentive rates
on the jobs in question, especially in view of the undisputed
fact that method changes had been made.

Considering the

language of Section 10(a), which accords the Company the right
to make changes in incentive rates, irrespective of method
changes, and the fact that Section 10(g) provides for rate
changes when methods of production have changed, I consider the
scope or magnitude of the method changes to be immaterial.
Indeed, by allowing incentive rate revisions for "changes in
method of production or changes in the construction of tools
and dies," Section 10(g) means that rates may be revised because of manual method changes as well as changes in machinery
and tools.

Hence I must reject the Union's

argument that only

method changes resulting from changed machinery or tools warrant
overall incentive rate revisions.
The Union's reliance on Section 10(c) and 10(d) of the
contract is misplaced.

Neither of those Sections restrict the

Company from making rate changes under Section 10(a).

Obviously

the former sections cannot be interpreted to nullify the express
language of Section 10(a) which authorizes the Company to change
adjust or modify job rates.

Rather 10(c) and (d) mean that those

incentive rates in effect at the date of the contract, and which
are not changed thereafter in accordance with Section 10(a) may
not be challenged as to validity in arbitration.

And a rate

-6which is installed or changed after the effective date of the
contract which has not been challenged under the Section

10(a)

proviso, shall be considered an established rate and no longer
challengeable as to validity.

Neither 10(c)

or (d) support

the Union in the instant case.
So far as the accuracy or validity of the changed rates
are concerned, the Union's challenge is based upon an assertion
and evidence that affected employees have been unable to achieve
adequate earnings, and that the earnings they have made are
markedly less than what they received under the old rates.

From

this the Union concludes and argues that the rates are "too
tight", that they must be inaccurate because they deprive the
employees of an opportunity to make adequate incentive, and
therefore constitute a "destruction" of the former incentive
rate rather than a legitimate rate revision.
The Company sharply disputes the earning figures adduced
by the Union, contending instead that on many jobs the employees
are doing as well or better than before and that on some jobs
they are doing less well.

The Company also suggests that

employees may be "fighting the rate" to support their contentions
in this arbitration proceeding.
I need not decide these factual questions because the
earnings of employees under new incentive rates compared with
their earnings under prior rates are not the best evidence.
Nor, standing alone, are they determinative of the validity or
inaccuracy of an incentive rate.

The best evidence, and the

-7well accepted method of attacking the accuracy of an incentive
rate, and in my judgement, the method contemplated under
Section 10(a) of the contract, is to show that the times
attached to the job elements are technically or scientifically
incorrect; that the wrong elements were timed or that some
elements were wrongly omitted or included; that there was inadequate consideration of job variables; that time was not
allotted for fatigue and personal needs; that conditions at the
time the study was made were not average; and that other
recognized time study and incentive plan methods either were
not considered or incorrectly utilized.
Union has not done this.

In this proceeding the

On the contrary, it concedes that it

has not checked the technical accuracy of the times or elements
involved.

Therefore, in this proceeding, the Union has not made

out a case to challenge the validity of the rates which the
Company installed subsequent to the method changes.
For the foregoing reasons the Union's grievance must be
denied.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The method changes and rate changes
established by the Company in the Heavy
Link Department were not in violation of
the contract.

Eric J. SchmertzJ
Arbitrator

-8DATED: April 26, 1976
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-sixth day of April, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that the
executed the same.

